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When a court of appeals renders three separate opinions in the
same case in a period of six years on solely procedural issues, a
judge is sometimes moved to philosophize. The experience prompt-
ed Judge Medina to make these, by now, well known observations:
Class actions have sprouted and multiplied like the leaves of the
green bay tree. No matter how numerous or diverse the so-called
class may be or how impossible it may be ever to compensate the
individual members of the class, a champion steps forth. Thus
class actions have been brought 'on behalf of all subscribers to
business telephones in New York County, all Master Charge credit
card holders similarly situated, all consumers of gasoline in a given
state or states, all homeowners in the United States, and even all
people in the United States.' So far as we are aware not a single
one of these class actions including millions of indiscriminate and
unidentifiable members has ever been brought to trial and de-
cided on the merits. But the preliminary mini-hearing on the
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merits such as those conducted by Judge Tyler in order to decide
whether or not this case was a proper class action, and the huge
and unavoidable expense of producing witnesses and documents
pursuant to discovery orders, have brought such pressure on de-
fendants as to induce settlements in large amounts as the alterna-
tive to complete ruin and disaster, irrespective of the merits of
the claim.'
Whether one shares these sentiments or not; whether one regards
the class action device as legalized blackmail or an effective vehicle
for problem solving; and, indeed, whether one's perspective is that
of an aggrieved consumer or a persecuted member of management,
the plain and simple truth for lawyers is that class actions have
become and will remain a very permanent part of the practice.2
For this reason and because we do not regard ourselves as schol-
ars, much less philosophers, it is not the purpose of this article to
discuss the myriad of philosophical, consumer, economic and histori-
cal problems and issues inherent in any analysis of the class action
device. Partially inspired by the painful experience of the Eisen
case, much recent literature already exists on these subjects.3 We
intend to discuss Eisen IV but only because it provides the practi-
tioner resisting class certification with case precedent for that
which Rule 23 and the 14th Amendment plainly require: individual
notice, paid for by the plaintiff, to class members whose identities
1. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018-19 (2nd Cir. 1973),
better known as Eisen III. The other Eisen decisions are 41 F.R.D. 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) and 370 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1966), Eisen I; 391 F.2d 555 (2nd
Cir. 1968), Eisen II; 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the district court's "mini-
hearing" in Eisen III; and 42 U.S.L.W. 4804, decided May 28, 1974, which
presumably will gain popular recognition as Eisen IV.
2. There were 4,622 Rule 23 class action cases pending as of December
31, 1973. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Semi-Annual Report of
the Director, at 35 (1974).
3. Writings critical of the device in damage actions include: Handler,
The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-
The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLumv. L. REv. 1, 4-12
(1971); American College of Trial Lawyers, Report and Recommendations
of the Special Comm. on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proced-
ure (1972); and the Motion and Brief of National Association of Realtors
For Leave to File a Brief As Amicus Curiae, in Kline v. Coldwell, Banker
& Co. Realtors 73-2169 (9th Cir. 1974), the latter containing an excellent
historical argument that the class action device never intended for damage
actions. Writings favoring the (b) (3) suit include Note, 87 HARv. L. REv.
426 (1973); and Moore, The A.B.A., The Congress and Class Actions: A
Report, 3 Class Action Reports No. 2 (1974).
are known or ascertainable in those actions maintained under 23
(b) (3).4
This, then, is intended to be an article for the lawyer whose client
is suddenly confronted with one of these "Frankenstein monster [s]
posing as a class action".5 Our objective is to set forth the argu-
ments and methods available to counsel in seeking to prevent a
class from being certified. In order to sharpen the analysis and
arguments we will use a hypothetical class action as a model. Since
most of the criticism and praise of the class action device has been
focused on complaints filed under section (b) (3), observations will
be directed primarily at that part of Rule 23.6 In the end, if this
writing sounds more like a brief in support of a motion to dismiss
a complaint as a class action, rather than a scholarly analysis of
Rule 23, we will have accomplished our objective.
First, some background. The criteria for class determination con-
tained in Rule 23 (a) and (b) (3) do not fall into discreet categories.
For example, if the issues raised by the complaint permit counsel
to argue that common questions of fact and law do not predominate
over questions affecting individual members, it is obvious that the
same allegations may be used to show that the action is inherently
unmanageable. Similarly, if the complaint clearly describes a class
of sufficient numerosity, counsel may concede satisfaction of that
requirement, but argue that the sheer size of the class would make
the courthouse a coliseum 7 and the case incapable of judicial resolu-
4. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 (1974).
5. Eisen 1, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
6. The pertinent parts of Rule 23 that concern us here are:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the represent-
ative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as
a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
7. City of Philadelphia v. Am. Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1973).
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tion. Another prerequisite is that there be questions of law or fact
common to the class. It is a rare case in which defense counsel
cannot argue an absence of complete commonality, accentuate the
differences and contend that the lack of sameness will make it im-
possible to adjudicate the dispute without confusion, separate
proofs and great inefficiencies.8 Similar overlap exists with respect
to the other requirements of 23(a)--i.e., that the claims of the rep-
resentative parties are typical of the class 9 and that the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.1 0
In marshalling these factors into a cohesive attack on a class ac-
tion complaint, counsel must consider the requirements of Rule 23
with reference to the legal and factual theories pleaded, the appli-
cable substantive law and any facts learned in discovery on the
class issues. While each such complaint usually suggests a different
approach from a defense standpoint, we believe that by using a
hypothetical complaint and demonstrating how it can be chal-
lenged, the basic defense techniques will be disclosed.
THE MODEL
Class actions falling within the requirements of 23(b) (3) have
been filed in many areas of substantive law. In order to properly
focus upon the range of problems, we will select one such area-
antitrust. Further, let us postulate a hypothetical fact situation.
Five doorknob manufacturers have been indicted under section 1
and section 2 of the Sherman Act1 1 for conspiring (a) to fix
the price of doorknobs over a ten year period and (b) to restrain,
monopolize and/or attempt to monopolize trade in interstate com-
merce. The relevant market for each violation is alleged to be the
United States. A lawyer in Chicago happens upon two clients, both
Illinois residents, who wish to sue. Purchaser A manufacures
doors and installs doorknobs on fifty percent of them. He buys
his requirements from a building materials wholesaler. In some
8. Shaw v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 F.R.D. 566 (D.N.H 1973); Boshes v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
9. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 73,879 (E.D. Pa.
1970), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 618 (3rd Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 407 U.S.
925 (1972).
10. Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1-2 (1890).
instances, quantity discounts are given; in others he buys off list.
In no event does he make any direct purchases from any of the
defendants and only three of the defendants sell to A's wholesaler.
Purchaser B is a school teacher who purchases his doorknobs from
a hardware store, which in turn purchased from a building materi-
als supply house. Three years ago he bought a new house. In each
case, the initial seller of the doorknobs acquired by A and B within
the period was one or more of the defendants.
A complaint is filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. The complaint defines the alleged
class as follows:
Plaintiffs are representatives of classes as defined by Rule 23 (b) (3)
and bring this action on behalf of all members of each class. The
classes consist of all those persons similarly situated who have pur-
chased, directly or indirectly, doorknobs from one or more of the
defendants during the last ten years and have thereby sustained
damages as a result of said purchases and will continue to sustain
damages in the future. Specifically, the class wherein Purchaser
A is a representative plaintiff includes all door manufacturers and
all other persons who have purchased from wholesalers and resold.
The class wherein Purchaser B, the school teacher, is a representa-
tive plaintiff includes all purchasers of doorknobs within the ten
year period from retail outlets and all persons buying single family
houses that were built within the period.
Tracking the indictment in the government criminal case, the com-
plaint alleges the following acts in. violation of the Act:
1. In furtherance of their combination and conspiracy to
fix, maintain and stabilize the prices of doorknobs in the United
States, the defendants have held meetings at various times, in var-
ious locations where they agreed (a) to increase the rtices of door-
knobs, (b) to issue identical price lists; and (c) to police adherence
to the agreed upon published prices.
2. Further, the defendants have contracted, combined and/or
conspired among themselves and others to restrain, monopolize
and/or attempt to monopolize trade in interstate commerce (a) by
agreeing to fix, maintain, control, limit or discontinue the manufac-
ture of doorknobs; and (b) by agreeing to allocate markets and
divide customers for the sale of doorknobs.
After losing a motion to stay proceedings in the action pending
final disposition of the government's criminal case, defendants seek
to have the court determine whether any of the alleged classes can
be certified.12 The deposition of each individual plaintiff is imme-
12. It is clear that plaintiff bears the burden of alleging and satisfying
the requirements of Rule 23, D & A Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
19 F.R.D. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); 2 BAREON & HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PRoCEDURE, § 571, at p. 342 (Wright Ed. 1961). Nevertheless, defendants
are usually forced (probably because plaintiffs believe that the require-
ments are satisfied by the complaint itself) to file a motion pursuant to
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diately noticed and taken, with questioning confined to matters per-
tinent to the certification issues. Among other things, defendants
learn the following facts:
1. Purchaser A, the door manufacturer, only began making doors
three years ago. He is the father of the attorney who represents
him. During that period he had purchased 100,000 doorknobs in
1000 separate transactions. While he has used different wholesal-
ers, he has purchased doorknobs only in Illinois and from only
three of the five defendants. A belongs to the National Doorknob
Institute whose membership is limited to wholesalers and door
manufacturers. There are fifty thousand members and the mem-
bership list is computerized. If individual notice is ordered for
these individuals, A has offered to pay for it.
2. Purchaser B has no assets and earns $15,000 per year. In ad-
dition to the knobs acquired with the new house, B has bought six
replacement knobs from a local hardware store in the last three
years.
3. Although both have complained about the increasing price and
shortage of doorknobs, neither A nor B knows or has any opinion
of the causes of the shortage or price increases, nor has either asked
their attorney what he believes are the cause or even what the
complaint alleges to be the cause. Prior to their depositions, nei-
ther A nor B had seen a copy of the complaint. B could not
identify any of the named defendants and A only knew two of
them. B testified that he had no knowledge of the doorknob indus-
try. Since A's experience with the industry had been limited to
dealings with wholesalers, he stated that he knew little of the
methods of production, distribution and marketing of doorknobs by
the defendants.
4. The plaintiffs seek damages on behalf of themselves and the
classes in the amount of $100,000,000.
5. It is also determined that two of the defendants have plants
in Illinois and employ a total of 2000 persons. The defendants are
all publicly traded corporations and each has several thousand
shareholders in Illinois.
6. It is also determined that ten million doorknobs have been
sold each year and that approximately one hundred million door-
knobs have been sold during the period. Further, it is established
that in the year 1973 only, there were two million new housing
starts.
The defendants move jointly and request that the Court not certi-
fy either class and further request that the class allegations be dis-
Rules 23 and 12 to dismiss the class allegations and for a determination that
the action cannot proceed as a class action.
missed. They contend that the action cannot proceed as a class
action for the following reasons:
1. The plaintiffs do not insure the adequate representation of the
class; their claims are not typical; plaintiffs interests conflict with
those of the class and they lack the financial resources and interest
required for adequate representation.
2. Common questions of law and fact do not predominate over
questions affecting individual class members.
3. The action is inherently unmanageable since it is brought on
behalf of untold millions of people.
The defendants file a joint brief in support of that motion. It is
that brief, with some editorial comment, that occupies the balance
of this article.
Tim NAzvD PLAINTIFFS WILL NOT ADEQUATELY REPRESENT
THE INTERESTS OF THE ABSENT MEMBERS OF THE
PURPORTED CLASS
A. The Requirement of Adequate Representation
No action may be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(a)
(4) unless the "representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class".13 Thus, Judge Tyler in his first
Eisen opinion said:
Now that amended Rule 23 purports to obliterate the old distinc-
tions between 'true', 'hybrid' and 'spurious' class actions, however,
the requirement that plaintiff be able to fairly insure the adequate
representation of all becomes considerably more significant since
all members of the class are bound by the judgment unless they
expressly ask to be excluded from the class.14
B. The Respects in Which Representation By the Named
Plaintiffs Is Inadequate
The proposed class in the hypothetical case includes so many peo-
ple with such a complexity of interests located throughout such
a large geographical area that it is doubtful that any reasonable
number of people could be found who would adequately represent
all the members of the class. Clearly, the two named plaintiffs
fall far short of providing adequate representation. Their interests
are not coextensive with the interests of all the members of the
class, their interests conflict with the interests of the class members
and they lack the resources, knowledge and interest required for
the prosecution of this action on behalf of this class.
13. FED. R. Civ. PRo. 23 (a) (4).
14. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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1. Plaintiffs' Interests Are Not Coextensive With Class Interests
In order for a named plaintiff adequately to represent a class,
it is necessary that the plaintiff's interests be coextensive with the
interests of the class members. 15 That is to say, a class is not ade-
quately represented if the claims of the named plaintiffs are not
typical of the claims of all the members of the class. 16
In the 'present case, the claims of the named plaintiffs are not
typical of the claims of the majority of class members. Although
the classes include potentially millions of purchasers of doorknobs,
there are only two named plaintiffs. The classes include almost
all purchasers of doorknobs throughout the United States, and their
claims are predicated upon purchases of doorknobs under the pecu-
liar conditions prevailing in each geographical locality in which
they made purchases. Plaintiffs' only doorknob purchases in Illi-
nois occurred in a small area of metropolitan Chicago. Purchaser
A has only purchased from three of the five defendants and Pur-
chaser B does not even know which of the five defendants manufac-
tured the doorknobs that he bought.
Moreover, Purchaser B purports to represent all persons buying
new housing units in the past ten years, and their claims are predi-
cated upon the peculiar conditions existing in the geographic areas
where their units were bought at each point in time during the
ten year period. On the other hand, Purchaser B acquired his house
in Chicago three years ago. Purchaser A has only been buying
doorknobs for the last three years, only in the Chicago area and
then only indirectly from three of the defendants.
Plaintiffs claims are, therefore, not typical of the claims of a great
number of purported class members. And, in pressing their claim
concerning purchases of some of the relevant doorknob products
from an unknown number of the five defendants in a limited area
during a limited period of time, plaintiffs will provide no repre-
sentation for class members whose purchases were made at differ-
ent times.
17
15. See 3B Moore, FEDERAL PRAcTicE, 23.07-[2] (2d Ed. 1974).
16. See, e.g., Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940).
17. See, e.g., Hettinger v. Glass Specialty Co., 59 F.R.D. 286, 290, 296
(N.D. Ill. 1973).
2. Plaintiff's Interests Conflict With Class Interests
Purchaser A cannot provide adequate representation for the class
whose claims he seeks to assert because his interests are in direct
conflict with the interests of the class members in several respects.
The -primary conflict arises from the fact that the attorney for the
purported class is the son of one of the named plaintiffs. Courts
have often ruled that the conflict between an attorney's interest
in obtaining a large legal fee and the class members' interest in
maximizing the damage recovery precludes an attorney from acting
in the dual role of plaintiff and attorney for a class. In Graybeal
v. American Savings & Loan Association,1 8 for example, the court
ruled that such a conflict of interest precluded the attorney-plain-
tiff from meeting the requirement of adequate representation."9 It
held:
Plaintiffs have placed themselves in the dual roles of attorneys for,
and representatives of, the proposed class. These dual roles are in-
herently fraught with potential conflicts of interests. In any class
action there is always the temptation for the attorney for the class
to recommend settlement on terms less favorable to his clients be-
cause a large fee is part of the bargain. The impropriety of such
a position is increased where, as here, the attorney is also the rep-
resentative who brought the action on behalf of the class, and
where, as here, the potential recoveries by individual members, in-
cluding representatives, of the class are likely to be very small in
proportion to the total amount of recovery by the class as a whole.
Thus Plaintiffs may stand to gain little as class representatives, but
may gain very much as attorneys for the class.20
Similarly, the court in Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.,
2 1
found a member of the law firm representing plaintiffs an inade-
quate representative, stating:
The difficulty I have with this situation lies in the fact that the
possible recovery of Mr. Cotchett as a member of the class is far
exceeded by the financial interest Mr. Cotchett might have in the
legal fees engendered by this lawsuit. The propriety of this ar-
rangment is cast further into doubt by the consideration that the
individual members of the class are unlikely to receive any signifi-
cant personal benefit from a successful prosecution of this suit and,
indeed, may ultimately have to pay for it through subsequently in-
creased costs of car rental.
Thus, it may well be '.. . that plaintiff has interests antagonistic
to those of the remainder of the class.'
2 2
18. 59 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 1973).
19. Accord, Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 57 F.R.D. 545, 546,
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104, 105-
06 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Shields v. Valley National Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 449-
50 (D. Ariz. 1971).
20. Gabreal v. Am. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C.
1973) (emphasis added).
21. 56 F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
22. Id. at 554.
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This problem of conflicting interests is by no means alleviated
in a case such as the present one where the named plaintiff is not
the attorney himself but rather a relative of or other person closely
allied with the attorney. This is so because the primary economic
interest of Purchaser A's family resides in the legal fees and not
in the relief sought on behalf of the class.
23
But even apart from the relationship between one of the named
plaintiffs and his counsel, there are other respects in which the
interests of the named plaintiffs conflict with the interests of class
members. For example, the class includes thousands of people who
are shareholders or employees of defendants, manufacturers' repre-
sentatives selling defendants' products and many others who, it can
be presumed, are not in sympathy with the goals of this action.
Plaintiffs cannot represent a class containing persons whose inter-
ests are so directly in conflict with their own.24
The plaintiff in Chicago v. General Motors Corporation,25 sought
to represent all the residents of Chicago in an automobile air pol-
lution action against numerous defendants. The Court held that
plaintiff could not adequately represent the class because the class
included a group of people not in sympathy with the aim of the
litigation:
We do not believe that plaintiff City adequately represents the
class it purports to represent. Although plaintiff and its class exist
in a common atmospheric condition, we do not think this action
could be said to be in the interest of all Chicago corporate and in-
dividual residents. There are many motor vehicle dealerships, re-
pair and service stations, and gasoline outlets that would be ad-
versely affected by some of the relief plaintiff seeks. Obviously,
some unemployment would result if plaintiff successfully per-
23. It is remarkable how often such a relationship exists between plain-
tiff's counsel and the named plaintiff in Rule 23 (b) (3) suits. Such a rela-
tionship combined with deposition testimony to the effect that the named
plaintiff had not read the complaint or did not understand the theories as-
serted or could not remember how, why or when the idea to file the com-
plaint had arisen, have led a few courts to be extremely skeptical of the
motives of plaintiff and, thus, his capacity to represent the class. See, e.g.,
Graybeal and Cotchett and the cases cited therein.
24. See, e.g., Chicago v. General Motors Corporation, 332 F. Supp. 285,
288 (N.D. li. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972);
Crawford v. Texaco, Inc., 40 FRD 381, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Gray v. Reuther,
99 F. Supp. 992, 993-94 (E.D. Mich. 1951), affd per curiam, 201 F.2d 54 (6th
Cir. 1952).
25. 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. ll 1971).
suaded this Court to issue an order banning the sale of certain mo-
tor vehicles. At least these local residents and citizens have an in-
terest adverse to that of the City. Moreover, we doubt whether
the plaintiff, charged with a community health problem, adequately
represents those residents and citizens who are strongly attached
to the motor vehicle as a recreational or luxury item and would
not want their individual activities curtailed or made more expen-
sive.26 -
Similarly, in Gray v. Reuther,27 the court ruled that a member
of a local union could not represent the membership in an action
seeking to overturn an ele6tion which ousted him from union office.
This ruling was based upon the existence within the class of a fac-
tion which had opposed the named plaintiff in the election:
... [P]laintiff was ousted from office after an election in which
approximately two thousand union members voted. Whether or
not the election was valid, it shows that a substantial body of the
membership of the Local is opposed to the plaintiff's position. The
strength of the faction antagonistic to the plaintiff is immaterial;
its existence indicates that the identity of interest that would qual-
ify plaintiff to represent the members of Local 12 is lacking.28
A final problem of conflict of interest arises from the fact that
the alleged class undoubtedly includes judges of this Court and
many members of their families, every clerk or other employee of
this Court and most of their families and will probably include
every member of the jury and members of their families.
3. Plaintiffs Lack the Resources, Knowledge and Interest Required
to Protect Class Interests
There can be no doubt that vigorous prosecution of the present
action on behalf of the purported class will be an expensive prop-
osition. Thus, substantial funds will be required in order to con-
duct discovery of the many defendants concerning the tremendous
number of issues raised in the complaint. And the complexity and
sophistication of the isues concerning the doorknob industry will
undoubtedly require analysis and eventual expert testimony from
economists and other expert witnesses. Beyond this, however, is
the obvious fact that the cost of notice to class members would
itself be staggering. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquein,29 the Supreme
Court held that the named plaintiffs in an action brought under
Rule 23 (b) (3) must pay for the cost of individual notice to those
class members whose identities are readily identifiable. While Pur-
chaser A has said that he is willing to pay for the cost of notifying
26. Id. at 288.
27. 99 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mich. 1951).
28. Id. at 993-94 (emphasis added).
29. 94 S. Ct. 2140 (May 28, 1974).
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members of the National Doorknob Institute, this group is not the
only class whom he seeks to represent. Further, the homeowner
purchaser class that Purchaser B seeks to represent can to some
extent be identified from the tax rolls. Yet Purchaser B obviously
has no assets to pay for notice to any such person. 30
It is clear that Purchaser B possesses no assets which could be
used to finance the expenses of this litigation. He lives on a small
fixed income, has no investments and the total of his liquid assets
is less than $1,000. It is therefore perfectly clear that he would
be unable to finance the vigorous prosecution of the lawsuit; or
to pay defendants' court costs should he be unsuccessful.3 1 Plain-
tiffs' lack of financial resources precludes them from representation
of this gigantic class.
3 2
The financial resources of the plaintiffs in Ralston v. Volkswagen-
werk A.G.,3 3 were far greater than those of both of the named
plaintiffs in the present case. Yet the court ruled that they were
inadequate for the task of representing a class of approximately
18,000 Volkswagen purchasers. The court reviewed the potential
expenses for discovery, expert witnesses and other litigation costs
and concluded:
Seeking to represent a large group of people as a class repre-
sentative in a lawsuit is a very heavy responsibility. It should
never be undertaken lightly, and the court should allow such rep-
resentation only upon a firm foundation that the named plaintiffs
are willing and financially able to shoulder that burden. Such a
30. Note that Eisen IV may or may not eliminate the "consumer" class
action. Here, for example, a large quantity purchaser is a plaintiff and may
well be willing to pay for individual notice. On the other hand no notice
problems will be presented if the "consumer class" is admittedly large but
not capable of individual identification. What Eisen IV will do is eliminate
the large class consisting of persons, whose identities are available from
computer records in the possession of the defendants. Thus, defense coun-
sel will still have to rely substantially on the traditional arguments to de-
feat certification.
31. That the Court may owe a duty to defendants to make sure that
plaintiffs are financially responsible for the costs of litigation is suggested
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (d), which permits the Court to tax costs in appropriate
situations. Additionally, Rule 23 (d) (3) might be used as the basis for re-
quiring security for costs where appropriate. See also Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152-53 (May 28, 1974).
32. See, e.g., Miller v. Standard Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, Civil Action
No. 37901 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 30, 1972); Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 61
F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
33. 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
lawsuit should never be undertaken in the hope that at some future
date the existence of a class will aid the plaintiffs in carrying the
case to completion, because nobody knows whether other uniden-
tified members of the class are able or willing to finance the action.
Inadequate financing threatens the procedural and substantive in-
terests of all members of the class.
All of this is not to say that large numbers of persons should
not coalesce their finances in supporting a class action. But the
pooling should be made before the suit is filed, thereby assuring
sufficient resources, rather than relying upon court processes to co-
agulate a class who may be willing and unable to underwrite the
action.
It is" my conclusion that the named plaintiffs have not shown
their ability to protect adequately the interests of the class.3 4
Finally, the named plaintiffs could not adequately represent the
class because they lack the requisite knowledge and interest to vig-
orously prosecute this action. They have, for example, testified to
having no knowledge concerning the alleged nationwide conspiracy
described in their complaint or the millions of persons who may
be included or excluded from the class. Prior to their depositions,
the plaintiffs had never seen a copy of the complaint, had no idea
of the nature of the allegations made therein and did not even know
the identity of the named defendants. Neither of the plaintiffs has
ever had any discussion with their attorneys with respect to the
nature of the substantive allegations of the complaint or their pur-
chases of doorknobs or their damages. They admit that they have
no knowledge of the industry.
In such circumstances, they are unable to provide the knowledge
or judgment necessary to guide their attorney in the conduct of
this litigation, and they are inadequate to represent the absent
members of the class. "The class is entitled to more than blind
reliance upon even competent counsel by uninterested and inex-
perienced representatives." 35
Coi ON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT Do NOT PREDOMINATE
OVER QUESTIONS AFFECTING ONLY INDIVIUAL CLASS MENBERS
A. The Predominance Requirement
An action may not be maintained as a class action under Rule
(b) (3) unless the court finds, not only that there are questions of
fact or law common to the members of the class, but also that the
common questions predominate over any questions affecting only
34. Id. at 434.
35. In Re Goldchip Funding Co., CCH 1974 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 94,382
at 95, 322 (iLD. Pa. 1974).
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individual members. In the leading state class action case of Free-
man v. State-Wide Carpet Distributors, Inc.,3 6 the Michigan Su-
preme Court refused to permit an action which failed to meet the
predominance requirement to be maintained as a class action. Al-
though common questions of law and fact were clearly present, the
court found that the common questions did not predominate:
The rule requires that . . . there must be 'common questions
of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief' must
be sought .... Although the bank's status as a holder of various
promissory notes may be involved in each of the plaintiffs' claims
and although each plaintiff was subjected to the same advertising
or other uniform pattern of conduct, the defendants' liability to
each plaintiff will depend upon specific facts which, by the nature
of these transactions, cannot be common to all plaintiffs or to any
substantial number of them.3 7
The court concluded that in the absence of predominant common
questions any effort to adjudicate the claims of the class members
simultaneously would prove impossible:
In short, the very substantial disparity of issues 'of law and facts
between the multiple plaintiffs' claims would render any judicial
proceeding in which all were sought to be adjudicated simultan-
eously, incomprehensible to the litigants, their counsel and the
chancellor as well.38
In Robiner v. General Motors Corporation,39 a state court of gen-
eral jurisdiction had to consider the application of the predomi-
nance requirement to a proposed class action on behalf of more
than 700,000 owners of Corvair automobiles. Plaintiffs predicated
their complaint upon alleged fraudulent concealment of heating and
exhaust systems defects in automobiles sold to the class, and they
asserted that common questions were presented concerning the
existence of defects and fraudulent concealment of them. Circuit
Judge Blair Moody, Jr. concluded, however, that the common issues
did not predominate over individual issues. He stated:
Nevertheless, sound administration of justice compels this Court to
conclude in its discretion that the complexity of legal issues ...
36. 365 MVich. 313 (1961).
37. Id. at 320.
38. Id.
39. Civil Action No. 172865 (Cir. Court, Wayne County, Mich., July 21,
1971). Despite its parochial limitations, the case is cited because the opin-
ion, written by a state trial court judge, provides illuminating insight into
these kinds of problems from a perspective not often available.
(not to mention 700,000 possible factual distinctions) forecloses and
outweighs the Plaintiffs' claim of sufficient commonality of the le-
gal issues of fraud, if such exists.
Likewise, this cause does not involve common questions of fact
with respect to the possible claim of each member of the class of
700,000 owners. Independent factual determinations would be nec-
essary regarding such matters as the design and manufacture of the
direct air heating unit for each of the nine years the vehicle was
in production, the use of Corvair vehicles by individual members
of the class, the alleged exposure of class members to exhaust
fumes, the factual differences with respect to implied and express
warranties of fitness and safety, the factors relating to maintenance
and condition of the vehicles, the manner of purchase of the ve-
hicles and the effect of the differing environments upon the subject
vehicles, among many others.40
After reciting the holding on predominance from the Freeman case,
Judge Moody concluded that the failure to meet the predominance
requirement precluded class treatment:
The diversity of probable legal and factual issues envisioned at
the present posture of this case combined with management encum-
brances reveal the pragmatic inappropriateness of such a broad
guaged proposed class action by the three Plaintiffs. [citations
omitted] .41
The complaint in this hypothetical action alleges that there exist
questions of law and fact which are common to the members of
each class and which predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members of either class. In order for defense counsel
to attack this allegation, he must argue that the individual issues
to be decided under the substantive legal principles (here, anti-
trust) on which plaintiffs' claims are predicated, far outweigh any
common issues.
B. The Elements of an Antitrust Damage Claim
In order for a plaintiff to recover in an action for damages under
the antitrust laws, he must establish:
(1) That a violation of the antitrust laws has in fact occurred;
(2) That the anticompetitive impact of the violation proxi-
mately caused an injury to his business or property; and
(3) That such injury represents a certain dollar amount of
damages.
These requirements are not altered by the fact that a group of
claimants seeks to proceed by means of a class action. A procedural
rule, such as Rule 23, cannot vitiate the substantive requirement
40. Id. at 9-10.
41. Id. at 10-11.
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that each person seeking to recover damages must prove each sub-
stantive element of his own cause of action. A mere showing that
defendants have violated the Sherman Act is insufficient to estab-
lish a claim for damages under section I or 2 of the Act. The plain-
tiff must also establish his proximately caused injury and the
amount of such injury.
Thus, for example, in Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca Cola Co., 42 the
Second Circuit stated the underlying rationale, as follows:
While any antitrust violation disrupts the competitive economy to
some extent and creates entirely foreseeable ripples of injury which
may be shown to reach individual employees, stockholders or con-
sumers, it has long been held that not all of these have the req-
uisite standing to sue for treble damages and thereby take a leading
role in the enforcement of the prohibition in question. The private
action, intended as 'an ever-present threat to deter anyone contem-
plating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws' can only
serve as an effective deterrent if the courts are able to administer
it with some degree of certainty. Contourless rules of causation
would pose the threat of parallel relaxation of the standard of busi-
ness behavior enforced by the allowance of treble recovery.43
And, in Calderene Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Cir-
cuit, Inc.,44 the court stated:
It [the test for standing] acknowledges that while many remotely
situated persons may suffer in some degree as the result of an anti-
trust violation, their damage is usually much more speculative and
difficult to prove than that of a competitor who is an immediate
victim of the violation. Furthermore, if the flood-gates were
opened to permit treble damage suits by every creditor, stock-
holder, employee, subcontractor, or supplier of goods and services
that might be affected, the lure of a treble recovery implemented
by the availability of the class suit *** would result in an over-
kill.45
And the necessity of proof of impact or the fact of injury as to
each individual class member has been cited by several federal
courts in recent decisions denying class action treatment in anti-
trust actions. For example, in Shumate & Co., Inc. v. National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers, Inc.,46 the court held:
42. 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
43. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
44. 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
45. Id. at 1295.
46. 1973 Trade Cas. 74, 512 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
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In any antitrust action issue of injury is a critical component of
the determination as to liability and should not be confused with
still another issue requiring individual analysis, i.e., calculation of
the amount of damages. Recovery is not based on the conspiracy
itself but on the injury to the plaintiff. Even assuming that a con-
spiracy could be proved, liability could not be imposed until it was
shown that each individual class member would have traded in
listed securities but for their exclusion from the NASDAQ system
or that but for Rules 394 and 396 each individual nonexchange
broker would have traded off the floor with exchange members.
This inquiry would extend to 3,000 purported class members and
in effect would make these three cases completely unmanageable
as class actions.47
In the hypothetical action, plaintiffs allege that members of the
classes have sustained a total of $100,000,000 in damages (of course,
that is to be trebled). They predicate this damage claim upon two
separate counts alleging numerous violations of sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act. Clearly, in order to recover damages each
member of the class will .be required to establish in a jury trial
the fact of each violation, the impact of each such violation upon
him and the amount of his damages resulting from each such im-
pact.
1. Violation and Impact
As hypothesized above, our mythical complaint tracks the govern-
ment indictment and makes extensive allegations of violations of
the Sherman Act by both joint and unilateral activities of the de-
fendants. Plaintiffs challenge the operation of several phases of
the doorknob industry over the past ten years, and therefore have
put in issue defendants' nationwide activities in manufacturing, dis-
tributing and marketing of doorknobs. Proof of the alleged viola-
tions of price fixing and monopolization would involve this Court
in the supervision of discovery and trial of complex issues of the
structure and practices of the doorknob industry at every stage of
its operations throughout the United States. It is likely that a jury
trial of the issue of violation alone would take over a year.
While the complaint appears to allege a monolithic nationwide
conspiracy, there is no "nationwide market" for manufacturing, dis-
tributing, or marketing of doorknobs. Because of the geographi-
cally and functionally fractionalized structure of the doorknob in-
dustry, no 'proof of the allegations of the complaint would succeed
unless the plaintiffs established the existence of numerous localized
47. Id. at 94,298. Accord, Shaw v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 F.R.D. 566, 568
(D.N.H. 1973); Gneiting v. Taggares, 1973 Trade Cas. f 74, 440, at p. 93,997
(D. Ida. 1973); Nat'l Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D.
476, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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conspiracies at each functional level of the industry; yet any such
endeavor by the plaintiffs would necessarily further complicate this
litigation.
The necessity of proving the impact of the alleged conspiratorial
and unilateral activities upon each class member raises even more
significant individual questions. As demonstrated above, impact or
fact of injury is a wholly separate and distinct element from proof
of the amount of damages. Proof that the alleged unlawful activity
injured or had an impact on each of the members of the alleged
class would raise separate and distinct individual issues with respect
to each of the hundreds of thousands of class members.
The actual alleged impact of the defendants' activities appears
to focus upon the plaintiffs and other class members having to pay
artificially high prices for doorknobs and the reduction in the sup-
ply of doorknobs available to plaintiffs. This is consistent with the
deposition testimony of both plaintiffs, who claimed that their con-
cerns were "high prices" and "shortages". Proof of impact by each
class member, i.e., that the defendants' activities injured him, would
therefore require a showing that he paid artificially increased prices
for doorknobs as the proximate result of defendants' illegal activi-
ties or that he sustained measurable economic loss from an unavail-
ability of doorknobs proximately resulting from illegal activities by
defendants. Proof of this essential element of impact will neces-
sarily vary for each class member, resulting in a series of separate
trials of each claim encompassed within the alleged class. Whether
the alleged agreements, conspiracies and practices had any effect
upon the price paid by a particular class member requires an eval-
uation of multiple factors with respect to each transaction upon
which a claim is based. Thus, a myriad of individual questions of
fact and law will be raised with respect to each purchase of each
doorknob by each class member and, in resisting class certification,
defense counsel must identify and discuss each such issue. Discus-
sion of one such issue, nature of the seller and the pass on of any
overcharges, will serve to illustrate.
PROOF OF ARTIFICIAL OVERCHARGES IN PRICES OF DOORKNOBS
WILL RAISE INDIVIDUAL QUEsTIoNS WITH RESPECT TO
EACH TRANSACTION OF EACH CLASS MEMBER
Once the illegal activity has been shown to have had an effect
upon the price of a particular doorknob at some level of the produc-
tion or distribution system, the class member will then have to es-
tablish the identity of the person from whom he made each pur-
chase and trace the illegal price increment down the distribution
chain, through that seller to him.
The marketing of doorknobs is conducted through an extremely
complex distribution system. The class members could have pur-
chased doorknobs from (1) an independent distributor of the prod-
uct of defendants or another doorknob manufacturer in wholesale
bulk quantities; (2) a retail dealer selling a defendant's branded
products which were supplied to him by a third party, i.e., an inde-
pendent jobber or distributor; (3) a retail dealer selling the branded
products of another manufacturer which were supplied to him by
either the other company or a distributor; or (4) a wholesaler pur-
chasing from one of the defendants. The possibilities are endless.
Obviously, different problems of proof arise depending on the na-
ture of the seller in each transaction. Proof of the claim of a large
volume consumer who purchased directly from a defendant in large
quantities at a negotiated or bid price (e.g., Purchaser A) will in-
volve a different factual showing and raise issues different from
the proofs of an individual consumer like our school teacher who
purchased a defendant's branded product (1) as part of a house;
or (2) from a retail dealer, who in turn may have purchased either
from a defendant or from an independent distributor, who in turn
purchased from a defendant.
Since the vast majority of purchaser claims in the proposed class
would be based on purchases from a seller other than one of the
defendants, there is substantial question as to whether such remote
purchasers have the requisite standing to recover in an action under
the antitrust laws. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machin-
ery Corporation,4 8 the Court held that the fact that the first pur-
chaser who had paid an illegal overcharge to an antitrust defendant
had in turn raised the price of his own product and thereby passed
on the overcharge was not a valid defense to a claim by the first
purchaser so long as the first purchaser made an independent pric-
ing decision with respect to his own product and did not merely
resell at a price based on a pre-existing cost-plus contract. It has
been held that Hanover Shoe precludes recovery by a buyer subse-
quent in the chain of distribution to the first purchaser so long
as the latter has made an independent pricing decision.49
48. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
49. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (ED. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nor, Mangano v. Am. Radiator
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Even should the Court hold that remote purchasers such as plain-
tiffs are not precluded as a matter of law from bringing an anti-
trust action, plaintiffs and each class member must introduce evi-
dence to demonstrate that any conspiratorial overcharge was passed
on by each intervening seller in the chain of distribution. For ex-
ample, in In Re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,50 the court, while
finding that the mere presence of intermediate purchasers does not
deprive a consumer of standing as a matter of law, held:
On the other hand, the problems of damages and causation are
questions of fact for the jury. Evidence that a price advantage
was 'passed on' . . . provides sufficient substance for the question
of causation to be submitted to the jury.51
Thus, the requisite individual showing by each class member that
the alleged illegal overcharge was passed on through each interme-
diary in the distribution chain, and therefore was added to his pur-
chase price, precludes class action treatment. The recent decision
in Boshes v. General Motors Corporation,52 is directly in point.
There, the court rejected a proposed class of purchasers of General
Motors automobiles, holding:
As defendant pointed out in its motion to dismiss, and in its re-
sponse to plaintiffs' class action motion, several important factors
might either mitigate or eliminate a damage claim of any indi-
vidual plaintiff. For example, even if monopolization and price-
fixing resulting in 'excess profits' for GM were proven, plaintiffs
would still have to prove that retail dealers passed on the 'over-
charge' to them. Although on an individual basis the foregoing
would not be impossible, it would be an endless task on a class-
wide basis.63
Because of the complex chain of distribution for doorknobs, any
attempt to show such a passing on of overcharge in the instant
case would similarly be an "endless task." For example, assuming
that the plaintiffs could show that the defendants have conspired
and agreed to raise the price at which they sold doorknobs -by 2
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3rd Cir. 1971); see City & County
of Denver v. Am. Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971).
50. 1973 Trade Cas. f 74,733 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, - U.S. -
(1974).
51. Id. at 95,220 (footnotes omitted).
52. 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
53. 59 F.R.D. 589, 600 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (emphasis added). Accord, Bill
Minnieli Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 1973 Trade
Cas. 1 74,591 at 94,615-17 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
cents a doorknob, a purchaser of a defendant's branded doorknob
from an independent retail dealer who was supplied directly by the
defendant would be required to show that the dealer merely added
the two cent overcharge to his sales price. Even more significant
problems would be raised by a class member who purchased from
a retail dealer, who had purchased from an independent distributor,
who in turn had been supplied by a defendant. Proof of the claim
for such a class member would require a showing of the passing
on of the conspiratorial overcharge both by the distributor and the
dealer. This proof would require each class member to subpoena
each seller in the chain of distribution to testify as to the factors
he considered in establishing his prices. And the complex proof
on behalf of one class member based on one transaction would have
to be repeated for every one of his other transactions-and for
every transaction of every other class member.
While it is extremely doubtful whether any individual consumer
could make the showing necessary to sustain his standing to bring
the instant case, that question need not be decided at this stage
of the litigation. What must be recognized now is that the question
of standing and proof of passing on would be an individual issue
with respect to liability of the defendants to each individual class
member. As the court held in City & County of Denver v. Ameri-
can Oil Co.:
We do not disagree that the ultimate decision on the standing/
remoteness/pass-on issues must await development of the facts, but
we believe that at least where the apparent facts are such as here
exist, the factual differences among potential class members-dif-
ferences affecting liability-should be recognized before a case is
determined to be a class action.54
Recognition of these individual issues involved in each and every
indirect purchaser claim in itself demonstrates the inherent unman-
ageability of this action and the predominance of uncommon, highly
individualized questions of fact and law.
In sum, even if either purchaser could adduce evidence that de-
fendants' alleged violations had an impact upon his purchases at
his level, this evidence could not be used with respect to another
purchaser residing in Springfield or San Diego. Indeed, it is most
unlikely that the evidence concerning one of the named plaintiff's
transactions could be used to prove an impact upon any other of
his transactions-not to mention the transactions of his next door
neighbor, or even those of his wife.
54. 53 F.R.D. 620, 633 (D. Colo. 1971).
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2. Damages
In addition to proving all of the factors necessary to establish
violation and impact, each class member must also prove the ele-
ments of his damage claim. From the above discussion of impact,
it is evident that if the issue of impact does not raise common ques-
tions, the same is true a fortiori of the issue of the amount of dam-
ages. Damages could not be established -by the mechanical applica-
tion of any formula. To the contrary, 'proof of individual damages
for each of the claims asserted here would require a full-scale sep-
arate trial for each class member even if it be assumed arguendo
that violation and impact did present common questions. And in
an antitrust case such as this, where the questions of damages are
not easily separable from the questions of violation, the issues are
so interwoven that they must all be decided by the same jury, and
it would be unfeasible and fundamentally unfair to separate them
for trial.55
With respect to claims based on purchases of doorknobs, each
class member, to establish measurable damages, would be required
to show: (1) the price he paid for each purchase which he claims
was affected by defendants' violations; (2) what the price would
have been were there no violations; and (3) the amount of his pur-
chase.
In sum, the claim of each purchaser in the proposed class is a
function of his doorknob purchasing history. The obligation to
prove this claim separately as to each transaction of each claimant
may not be circumvented by lumping consumers into huge amor-
phous classes. The individual questions raised by these millions
of claims clearly predominate over any conceivably common ques-
tions, and, accordingly, class treatment is inappropriate.
TiS CASE IS INHERENTLY UNMANAGEABLE AS A CLASS AcTION AND
WOULD CREATE AN INSURMOUNTABLE BURDEN OF JuDIcIAL
ADMINISTRATION FOR THIS COURT
Lastly we come to that requirement of Rule 23 which defense
counsel so often find is fatal to the (b) (3) suit: manageability.
55. See Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494,
500 (1931); United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.),
The decisions involving large classes of individual consumers of
equal or more limited scope than the instant case have almost uni-
formly dismissed the class allegations because such a litigation
would be unmanageable. Therefore, we intend to show here why
the hypothetical class would present insuperable management diffi-
culties, both because of the sheer number of the persons involved
and because of the proliferation of separate issues with respect to
each class member's claim.
A. Inherent Unmanageability Alone Renders Class Treatment
Improper As A Matter Of Law
Federal Rule 23 (b) (3) requires a court to consider the demands
on its resources that a broad class action would impose and provides
that a class action should not go forward if the size of the class
or the complexities of the issues presented render the action ju-
dicially unmanageable. This principle was affirmatively stated in
D & A Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.56 There, the court held
that even though there were common questions, those common
questions did not predominate over the several independent factual
issues that must be determined with respect to each claimant. Such
individual determinations, the court sensed, would create an undue
burden on the resources of the bench and the participants.5 7
in Robiner v. General Motors Corporation,'; the court based its
refusal to allow a class action in part on severe manageability prob-
lems. Plaintiffs instituted a purported class action in behalf of
700,000 to 900,000 Corvair owners throughout the nation, alleging
fraud, concealment, breach of express and implied warranty and
negligence arising out of a claimed unsafe heater system in Cor-
vairs. Judge Moody observed that courts must carefully scrutinize
the demands on judicial time made by large class actions:
There can be no question that the awesome task of overseeing
and managing a proposed class action involving upwards of 700,000
members cannot lightly be undertaken by any trial court whose
primary responsibility is to preside over trials in open court and
to make just determinations upon repetitive assignment from bulg-
ing urban dockets. 59
Upon finding that individual issues existed as to the claims of each
of the 700,000 class members, the court dismissed the class action
because of substantial manageability problems:
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961), Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.R.D. 198, 200
(S.D. Ohio 1970).
56. 19 F.R.D. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
57. Id. at 366.
58. Civil Action No. 172865 (Circuit Court, Wayne County, Michigan, de-
cided July 21, 1971.).
59. Id. at 5.
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The diversity of probable legal and factual issues envisioned at
the present posture of this case combined with management en-
cumbrances reveal the pragmatic inappropriateness of such a broad
guaged proposed class action by the three Plaintiffs.60
No matter how the ambiguous class allegations of the hypotheti-
cal complaint are construed, the instant case involves a class of in
excess of hundreds of thousands of members. Moreover, because
of the complex individual questions involved in the proof of each
class member's claim, the problems of manageability are equally,
if not more, severe than were present in each of those cases. If
for no reason other than inherent unmanageability, therefore, the
instant class action should be dismissed.
City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co.,6 1 involved an alleged
class of approximately six million purchasers of gasoline in the
states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware. The complaint
alleged a horizontal price fixing conspiracy and followed a govern-
ment indictment and civil case. The court rejected the motorist
purchaser class as totally unmanageable. The court reviewed the
difficulties in litigating such a class action to judgment, particularly
the inherent difficulties in determining the claims of individual mo-
torists even assuming liability and an overall damage figure were
established:
In discussing the motorist who purchased gasoline from retail sta-
tions between 1955 and 1965, the Court is speaking by and large
of a class that made cash purchases at many different stations, at
many different times, at many different prices. Credit card state-
ments would be helpful, but they are not available from either
plaintiffs or defendants during most of the relevant period. The
proposed committee of counsel, who are supposed to evaluate the
claims of each motorist against the damage award, would be given
an almost impossible task to resolve. Even if this committee could
ultimately relate damage awards to the amount of miles one drove
within the trading area between 1955 and 1965, the committee
would still need some records upon which to base an award. Affi-
davits would not be sufficient by themselves. The only common
document which could satisfy the barest essentials of due process
in awarding damages to individuals would be income tax returns
for the relevant years. However, use of this type of record could
only result in unjustifiably prejudicing the rights of people who did
not itemize deductions. Simply stated, this Court is not satisfied
that the motorist who purchased from a retail service station be-
tween 1955 and 1965 within the states of Delaware, New Jersey and
60. Id. at 10.
61. 53 F.R.D. 45, 72-3.
Pennsylvania has available to him the type of records necessary
to make any meaningful distribution of damage awards if liability
and general damages are established. As a consequence, the Court
concludes that this portion of the Philadelphia-New Jersey class
is unmanageable, and hence, should not be certified. 62
Based on this analysis, the court held the proposed class was un-
manageable:
Despite the commendable ends sought to be achieved by these and
other cases to reach millions of ultimate consumers of a variety of
products by the technique of class representation, this Court be-
lieves that the line must be drawn somewhere in those cases involv-
ing untold numbers of members of the general public. The man-
ageability requirement of Rule 23 is a significant factor that must
be given due weight in reaching a determination on the propriety
of class representation in any given case. It is recognized, of
course, that each case must turn on its own facts. Numbers alone
would not necessarily be determinative as to whether a particular
class should be certified. Methods of marketing, price structures,
availability of records, economic data, and other considerations en-
ter into the picture. In cases pending in this Court, members of
the public who purchased gasoline from retail outlets between 1955
and 1965 in the three state area are legion in number. The indi-
vidual purchases made by them would run into astronomical fig-
ures. It is hardly to be expected that such individual members of
the motoring public would have records or other supporting indicia
of their many purchases. By any reasonable standard, it is difficult
for this Court to believe that Rule 23, as presently written, was in-
tended to reach the overly broad non-governmental class sought
to be represented by Philadelphia-New Jersey in the pending ac-
tions.63
More recently, in Devidian v. Automotive Service Dealers Assn.,64
a California appellate court held that a class suit limited to 250,000
purchasers of gasoline in a two county area during a nine month
period was unmanageable and therefore must be dismissed. The
plaintffs alleged a price fixing conspiracy in violation of the Cali-
fornia Antitrust Law. The defendants were members of an associa-
tion of service station dealers which had previously been indicted
and convicted on the same charges of price fixing as alleged in the
complaint. The court noted the problems in management which
would arise fronr the large size of the class (which is certainly
smaller than the size of the instant class), the difficulty of estab-
lishing an overcharge, in view of "the frequent [price] fluctuations
so universally common to the gasoline industry", the small size of
individual purchases with the resulting maximum damages of 30
cents per purchase, and the lack of written records to substantiate
individualpurchases.6 5 The court, assuming arguendo the existence
62. Id.
63. Id. at 73-4.
64. 1973 Trade Cas. 74,852 (Cal. Ct. of App. 1973).
65. Id. at 94,800.
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of an illegal two cents a gallon overcharge, then discussed further
obstacles to efficient management of the action:
But even if we have established that the gasoline was purchased
from one of the members of the conspiracy we are confronted with
the well known fact that very frequently service stations give trad-
ing stamps, drinking glasses, etc., all of which would have a mone-
tary value and would serve to reduce the 2-cent margin on the in-
creased price. We would also have to ascertain whether the trans-
action occurred on a day such as Monday when it is customary to
give additional trading stamps as a bonus. The proliferation of sit-
uations in which the 2-cent increase would have to be examined
to determine whether it truly reflected an increase of 2 cents is vir-
tually endless.
As to each of these purchases evidence would have to be received
as to whether the actions of the defendants caused any increases
in the prices, and if they did, the amount of such increases, whether
such increases were offset in whole or in part by the giving of trad-
ing stamps or other things of value, and a multitude, of other evi-
dentiary determinations, on purchases numbering in the millions,
with the vast majority involving purchases in which the over-
charges could not exceed 30 cents. 66
The class alleged in the instant complaint dwarfs those in the
Devidian case which involved only a small percentage of the num-
ber of class members here. The number of separate transactions,
and the difficulties of individual proof of the numerous separate
and distinct questions with respect to the claims of each class mem-
ber raised by the hypothetical complaint are therefore infinitely
greater. The conclusion that the class actions in those cases were
unmanageable leads inevitably to a similar conclusion in the instant
case.
Judicial rejection of attempts to aggrandize the claims of a single
plaintiff by attempting to bring class actions on behalf of large
numbers of individual consumers have by no means been limited
to the gasoline industry. In fact, in almost every litigated class
action decision involving a large class of consumers, the class has
been rejected on manageability grounds. See, for example, Boshes
v. General Motors Corporation,67 (rejecting a class of purchasers
of GM automobiles from 1965-1973); United Egg Producers v. Bauer
International Corp.,68 (finding a class of all consumers of eggs in
66. Id. at 95,801.
67. 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
68. 312 F. Supp. 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
the United States unmanageable); Hackett v. General Host Corp.,"
(dismissing as unmanageable a purported class action on behalf of
some six million consumers and 1.5 million purchasers of bread in
the Philadelphia area); Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,70 (where
the court rejected on manageability grounds a class of some 18,000
purchasers of Volkswagen automobiles in the Kansas City area).
These cases establish that class actions on behalf of large numbers
of individual consumers are unmanageable as a matter of law and
should not be permitted. In most of the above cases, the number
of class members was smaller than in the instant case and in every
one the claims asserted were narrower. The problems of manage-
ability alluded to therein would be far surpassed should the instant
action be allowed to proceed as a class action.
B. The Facts Establish That This Case Would Be Unmanageable
if Maintained as a Class Action
1. Number of Class Members
Although the complaint's ambiguous class definition makes it im-
possible to determine at this time the precise number of class mem-
bers, the class will include approximately two million individuals
even if limited to purchasers of residential units built in 1973. If
the entire ten-year scope of the complaint is included, there will
be additional millions of members. It is self-evident that a litiga-
tion with more than one million parties plaintiff is inherently be-
yond the administrative capability of any court.
If this were a case where each purported class member had en-
gaged in only a single transaction, it would be bad enough. But
it is clear that most class members have engaged in several trans-
actions, thus enormously compounding the problem. Conserva-
tively assuming a class with only one million members, if each per-
son averaged only two doorknob purchases annually, the litigation
would embrace two million annual transactions, or approximately
20 million separate purchases over the ten year period in question.
No judicial system is capable of adjudicating such a massive number
of separate claims. And any attempt to do so would not only be
futile but, far worse, could result in a breakdown of the machinery
of this court.
2. Pretrial and Trial
If this action were to proceed as a class action, each of the mil-
69. 1972 Trade Cas. f 73,879 (E.D. Pa. 1970), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d
618 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
70. 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.S. Mo. 1973).
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lions of class members would have to receive notice and appear
personally to present his claim.7 1 Moreover, defendants would be
entitled, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to discovery
from each claimant with respect to the factual data underlying his
claim for damages. Otherwise, defendants would lack the funda-
mental facts requisite to a defense of each claim. Discovery would
necessarily cover the basic individual facts of each class member's
claim. This individual discovery would take years to complete, and
the result would be a mountain of paper which would have to be
filed, examined and evaluated.
When, after notice and discovery are completed and the interven-
tion by class members has been processed and the actions are ready
for trial, the management and administrative problems would be-
come even more severe, particularly in light of plaintiffs' request
for a jury trial. As noted above, common treatment of the issues
of violation, impact and damage would be impossible. Since there
can be no liability in the absence of a showing of injury, and the
claims here are such that the fact of injury is, of necessity, a sepa-
rate and distinct question for each and every class member, the trial
of this action would entail detailed proof concerning every transac-
tion as to which damages are claimed.
Even disregarding the time and effort necessary for the inher-
ently complex proof of the existence of the various conspiracies and
illegal activities alleged in the two counts of the complaint, the type
of individual factual showing necessary for the proof of each class
member's claim amply demonstrates the total impossibility of man-
aging a case of this magnitude. In cases involving much more lim-
ited classes and where proof of violation, impact and damages
would have been far less complex, the courts have rejected class
actions because of the impossibility of ever conducting a trial of
the claims. For example, in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
72
an action following a successful government civil action against de-
fendants which established liability, the court, in considering the
propriety of a proposed settlement of a class action in which there
were only 14,156 claimants, noted the problem inherent in the trial
of these claims as a class action:
71. 53 F.R.D. 45, 71-2.
72. 1973 Trade Cas. 74,341 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Because of the dispartity in charges between cities and the vari-
ous competitive local factors, defendants are ready to contest each
of the 14,156 claims on the amount of damages, even though liabil-
ity may be proven. Assuming, for the moment, that the class ac-
tion status is resolved in favor of plaintiffs, interesting trial prob-
lems are present, since the case is to be tried to a jury. Defendants'
right to a jury determination of the damages for each asserted
claim is not lost because this is a class action. While Rule 23 has
been given broad application, no one suggests that it has repealed
the Seventh Amendment. After appropriate discovery by the de-
fendants has been obtained, and the litigation has not even reached
that point, it is fair to assume a minimum of one hour for the pres-
entation and defense of each claim. Thus, we can look forward
to about 14,000 trial hours on the damage claims alone. With an
average of 6 hours a day devoted to actually hearing testimony,
the trial will take some 2,300 days or about eleven years. Assum-
ing the greatest cooperation possible among advocates strongly
prosecuting or defending a position, you might dispose of the mat-
ter within 5 years....
The questions of administration raised by such a trial are: Do
you use the same jury to decide the entire damage issue? Does
the same judge preside over this trial to the exclusion of his other
more pressing work, such as criminal trials or application for pre-
liminary and permanent injunctions? Or is the judge relieved of
all other assignments? Even if several judges or juries are used
(including perhaps fragmentizing the proceedings into cities and
their respective judicial districts), a huge amount of judicial time
of any single judge and his court personnel would be devoted to
the matter.73
The problems involved in the trial of the instant claims would
be infinitely greater than in the Grinnell case. Here, there are over
one million class members each of whom will have a relatively min-
iscule monetary claim. Even if plaintiffs were able to marshall all
relevant data, including charge slips from the defendants and re-
ceipts for cash sales, at least one-half hour would be necessary for
each plaintiff to take the stand and demonstrate his damages.
Thus, even with a conservative estimate of the size of the class,
there would be required trial time of 500,000 hours (1,000,000 class
members x 0.5 hours/class member), and this does not include any
of the time required for proof and defense of the substantive allega-
tions of each of the complaint's counts. Assuming five hours of
trial per day, in one week the Court would have time to examine
forty plaintiffs (2 plaintiffs per hour x 5 hours per day x 4 days
per week). In that case, it would take 20,500 weeks (1,000,000 plain-
tiffs divided by 40 ,plaintiffs per week) of trial time. Such an un-
dertaking is clearly an impossible task for this Court and any jury.
The above analysis concerns only the minimum time required to
73. Id. at 93, 603-4 (emphasis added). See also Shaffner v. Chemical
Bank, 339 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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prove individual damages. There would, of course, be commen-
surate additional time required to prove impact on each individual
class member, and counterclaims by defendants against individual
class members arising out of credit card charges and other transac-
tions could multiply three or four-fold the time required to try the
claims of each class member.
The impossibility of such a situation led Judge Moody to find
the Robiner v. General Motors Corp., case unmanageable as a class:
In conclusion, it is inescapable that the instant case would cause
a number of management difficulties which further erodes the
claims of Plaintiffs that the instant case appropriately may be pur-
sued as a class action as formulated by Plaintiffs' Complaint.
74
CONCLUSION
We recognize that the foregoing arguments are neither unanswer-
able nor are they exhaustive. For example, the related problems
of manageability and predominance of common questions predi-
cated on the necessity of individual damage proofs are substantially
diminished if fluid class recovery concepts are adopted. 75 Eisen III
specifically rejected the concept of fluid class recovery on the dual
grounds that (1) Rule 23 does not contemplate or make provision
for such a procedure; and (2) if authorized, the procedure would
constitute a violation of due process of law.76
The issue was never reached in Eisen IV. If other courts choose
not to follow Eisen III and permit fluid recovery, then the coercive
impact of (b) (3) suits will increase because they will be less suscep-
tible to dismissal on manageability grounds.
Furthermore, Eisen IV leaves many questions unresolved which,
when decided, will define the ultimate impact of the individual no-
tice requirement. To be sure, Eisen IV should eliminate the large,
74. Civil Action No. 172865 at 6 (Cir. Court, Wayne County, Mich., July
21, 1971).
75. Proponents of the fluid recovery theory would substitute individual
recovery with recovery for the class. Without regard to individual injury
"class damages" would be computed and, after all individual claimants had
been compensated, the balance would be distributed to future "purchasers"
or "victims", without any showing of actual injury. For discussion of this
notion, see Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in
Consumer Class Actions, 701IzcH. L. REv. 338 (1971).
76. 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973). The result has been criticized in
Note, 87 HARv. L. REV. 426 (1973).
nationwide class action where identification of class members is
readily available from defendants' records. Many such actions,
however, involve class members whose identities are not known. 7
Further, in Eisen IV "readily available" meant that the information
was computerized and in the possession of the defendants. Assume,
however, that the identities of some or all of the class members
are available through records in the possession of ,private corpora-
tions or persons not parties to the litigation. Will courts require
individual plaintiffs to (a) undertake discovery from third parties
to obtain such information; or (b) commence litigation, if necessary,
to obtain it. Further, what if the information is a matter of public
record which would be made available by a public agency upon
the payment of a processing fee. Obviously, the burdens attendant
upon individual notification will be lightened considerably if the
requirement is confined to those circumstances where the informa-
tion is in the possession of the defendants. No case has yet ad-
dressed itself to these issues.
Another important question left undecided by Eisen IV is the per-
missibility of sending notice to class members as part of a routine
mailing.78 Even assuming that the cost of doing so would make
it sufficiently attractive to a plaintiff, it can be argued that the
probability that a person would disregard, ignore or fail to appre-
ciate such a notice would render it inadequate under Rule 23 (c) (2).
However these questions are resolved, we do not believe that
23 (b) (3) suits will fade away. The lure of multimillion dollar re-
coveries will continue to inspire the filing of such complaints. Prior
to Eisen IV, many of the decisions adverse to advocates of the de-
vice directly resulted from the zeal of over amibitous lawyers who
failed to appreciate that, in this area, it is the "limited issue" case
that stands a better chance of certification.71 Given the financial
limitations imposed by Eisen IV, it is entirely possible that class
suits filed in the future will be even more troublesome for defense
counsel and their clients since smaller classes should substantially
alleviate the administrative problems which plagued the court of
appeals throughout the Eisen appeals.s0
77. In the Eisen case, for example, the identities of "only" two million
of the six million class members were readily available, Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2147 (May 28, 1974).
78. The technique is suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas. Id. at 2144 n.1.
79. Thus, e.g., a suit brought on behalf of all Corvair owners was dis-
missed as unmanageable, Robiner v. General Motors Corp., Civil Action No.
172865 (Cir. Court, Wayne County, Mich. July 21, 1971).80. See Judge Mediria's "observations" in Eisen III, Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018-20 (2d Cir. 1973).
